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President Nixon declared a “War on Drugs”
nearly 40 years ago and established the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
to combat illicit drug use on the streets of
the United States (Thirty years of America’s
drug war: A chronology). In 2008 the
Bush administration continued this war
on drugs with the Merida Initiative, a
policy focusing on drug production and
US-Mexico border security. The Obama
administration has expanded this initiative
(US State Department). The Merida
Initiative is the US government’s effort to
combat “drug trafficking, organized crime,
corruption, illicit arms trafficking, money
laundering and the demand for drugs
in both the U.S. and Mexico” (Office of
National Drug Control Policy, 2013, p.
65). This study addresses the question of
whether the Merida Initiative has resulted
in lower rates of violent crime along the
US-Mexico border.
There are a variety of viewpoints on this
topic in the existing literature. According
to US government sources, the US and
Mexico have made great strides in reducing
border violence. The US Immigration
and Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE)
doubled the number of its agents along
the US-Mexico border in 2009 (Office of
National Drug Control Policy, 2013, pp.
2-6). In addition, ICE has increased the
number of border liaison officers that work
with Mexican law enforcement officials on
drug trafficking issues. The US government
claims to have reduced the flow of money
that supports Transnational Criminal
Organizations (TCOs), hindered the trade
in illegal weapons across the border, and
improved safety in border communities
including the reduction of violent crime
(Office of National Drug Control Policy,
2013, pp. 2-6).
However, according to local news sources,
the violence is still a concern for many
citizens who live along the border. County
officials in Douglas, Arizona say that
violence is ongoing in their region and
spreading eastward (Bell, 2013). They
note the disappearance of the Mexican
police chief in Nuevo Laredo in 2011. In
a town hall meeting with the citizens of
Douglas, consul officials from both the
US and Mexico admitted there was some
violence along the border but that anyone
not associated with the drug trade should
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be safe. When the consul officials tried
to talk about economic prospects, the
audience kept returning to the topic of
border violence (Bell, 2013). According to
another local reporter, a Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) official attributes the rise
of border violence in the El Paso region
to the friction between the Sinaloa cartel
and its rivals (Valdez, 2013). These news
reports suggest that people who live along
the border continue to be very concerned
about drug-related violence, as do some US
government officials who work there.
However, researchers and law enforcement
personnel need to be careful in attributing
a causal relationship between the Merida
Initiative, the drug trade, and border
violence. There are correlations to be
made between the ongoing drug violence
in Mexico and the violence along the
border. This does not solely mean that the
violence has crossed into the US. In a 2013
Congressional Research Service (CRS)
report, researcher Kristin Finklea suggests it
is not very easy to figure out levels of border
violence, nor is it easy to prove that violence
is linked to drug trafficking (Finklea, 2013
p.16). She questions the US government’s
claim that it has reduced “spillover” violence
along the US-Mexican border as some
people suggest, (Finklea, 2013, pp.1-21).
The RAND Corporation, an independent
public policy think tank, is equally critical
of the Merida Initiative but for different
reasons. Rand analysts criticize the lack of
coordination between the US and Mexican
agencies and worry that the lack could
worsen relations between the two countries
(Schaefer, , Bahney & Riley, 2009, pp.
45-54). This book also addresses some
of the United States’ shortcomings when
looking at how they support the Mexican
government and fighting to reduce violence
along the border. One shortcoming seen
by the RAND Corporation is the way
in which the Merida Initiative does not
fill holes between local and federal police
agencies and that local level police receive
no further assistance than before the
Merida Initiative (Schaefer et al., 2009, pp.
45-54).
According to political scientist Peter
Andreas (2009) the federal government’s
“out of control” narrative has exaggerated
the violence along the border, which has

convinced Congress to turn over more and
more resources to increase border security.
The US has built larger and larger barriers
that have been more symbolic than useful
in securing the border. This narrative is
that of a state (US) losing the ability to
manage movement and violence along an
international border. This perceived loss of
control gives state officials a pretext to rely
more on coercive policies to curb violence
and regain control of the border.
Andreas points out the reactions that the
state is taking (e.g., increased policing,
larger barriers) which glosses over the
actual reasons why there needs to be
increased policing. What they are glossing
over in terms of stricter laws, expansion
of agencies and rising agency budgets is
that the US-Mexican border has never
been secure. Therefore, the whole idea of
cooperation between the US and Mexico is
what Andreas calls “image crafting instead
of management crafting the border.” This
notion of image crafting does not depend
upon levels of enforcement but the way
in which the enforcement is perceived
(Andreas, 2009, pp. 4-10).
The Organization of American States
(OAS) issued a comprehensive report
on the state of anti-narcotic efforts in
the western hemisphere. Though this
international organization supported the
US’s “war on drugs in the past, it now
calls for different policies. Around 7,000
homicides were reported in Mexico that
were drug related in 2010” (Organization
of American States Secretary General,
2013, p.7). The OAS has collaborated
with academics and world leaders to try
and get control of drug trafficking. In
doing this the OAS tried to come up with
policy solutions but found that a lot of
Latin American states do not have the
money to put into polices that will help
combat drug trafficking in their countries
(Organization of American States Secretary
General, 2013, pp.5-9, 77). This latest
report does not give any clear cut evidence
that violence is directly on the border, but
it implies that the initiative is not doing
as well as Mexican officials had hoped in
reducing the root causes of the drug trade
which are organized crime, corruption,
illicit arms trafficking, money laundering
and the demand for drugs in both the
U.S. and Mexico (Office of National
Drug Control Policy, 2013, p. 65). My
research seeks to focus on the US side of
the border rather than the Mexican side,
but the number of homicides from the
OAS could indicate the previous scenario

that “spillover” is a possibility along the
border. The problem of identifying and
measuring border violence due to drug
trafficking and its relationship to the
Merida Initiative are very complex as
seen through this previous literature. My
question is has the 2008 Merida Initiative,
a joint US-Mexican policy on trafficking in
illicit drugs, increased US border security?
More specifically, has the Initiative reduced
drug trafficking violence on the US side of
the border? I hypothesize that the violent
crime has decreased but not to the extent
that the US government claims, nor can we
determine with certainty that the decrease
is the result of the Merida Initiative.
To test my hypothesis, I examined the
rate of violent crime in the four border
states of California, Arizona, New Mexico,
and Texas, from 1990 to 2013, available
from the US Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation (2009;
US Department of Justice, FBI) crime
statistics. I also reviewed assessments of the
Merida Initiative by Congress, the Office
of National Drug Control Policy, and
non-governmental organizations (e.g., the
Center for International Policy). If there
is a dramatic drop in violent crime since
2008 along the border than my hypothesis
is wrong. If not, then my hypothesis has
support as long as this drop in violent
crime is not attributable to the Merida
Initiative. I would spin the hypothesis
in a positive way: The first part of the
hypothesis is correct if there has been no
dramatic drop in violent crime rates along
the border. The second part is correct if
there is no consensus among a variety of
experts regarding the relationship between
the Merida Initiative and violent crime rate
patterns.
The year 1990 is the baseline for
comparison. In that year, President George
H. W. Bush proposed a dramatic increase
in spending on the “war on drugs,” and the
following year, the DEA’s budget increased
by 33% and continued to climb thereafter.
Starting in 1990 also gives us two decades
of data—ample enough to provide possible
patterns as I will look at global figures for
the four border states, as well as sixteen
border counties, with a focus on two
dissimilar ones. One is El Paso County
in Texas, which features the interlinked
cities of El Paso and Ciudad Juarez, and
has a long history of drug trafficking,
and Cochise County in Arizona, with the
small US town of Douglas across from the
much larger Mexican city of Agua Prieta,
and where the rise of drug trafficking is

more recent (Arizona Criminal Justice
Commission [ACJC], 2011, p.11). I chose
these two counties since they occupy two
disparate parts of the US-Mexico border
and have two different political economies
and histories. This focus shows whether
or not I can make a generalized statement
about the border and drug related violent
crime levels. I then compared these data
and government assessments with those of
non-governmental observers such as the
Organization of American States, Center
for International Policy and Witness for
Peace.
I gathered qualitative data from a variety
of governmental and non-governmental
sources, the latter which run a gamut of
political orientations. When conducting
this research we have to keep in mind the
possible bias from both governmental and
non-governmental sources. The data which
I will examine may be highly politicized
and therefore the results might be prone to
being exaggerated to show improvement.
Whereas critics of the “war on drugs” or the
Initiative may unfairly deflate the results
as insignificant when there might actually
be an overall improvement to the problem.
Secondly, we also have to consider the
structural factors that contribute to
violent crime and the “drug trade.” One
is political, that is, corruption and weak
state institutions (i.e., police, judicial and
legislative, etc). Another is social, referring
to communities wracked by drug cartels
or rampant emigration, or both. A third is
economic, namely, the lack of economic
opportunity. In sum these factors might
be alleviated greatly if the state institutions
were stronger and the economy was robust,
the communities would probably not be
rampant with emigration or wracked by
the drug cartels due to better economic and
enforcement policies in place (Shannon,
2008). These are factors which cannot be
examined at an in depth level due to the
lack of time and resources.
This assessment looked into whether the
Merida Initiative reduced violent crime
along the US side of the border. The data
that was gathered from the FBI shows some
very interesting trends in violent crime
along the border. The sixteen counties that
were examined showed that more violent
crime activity occurred in Cochise County
(Arizona) versus El Paso (Texas) over the
20 year plus time span (See Appendix
for county level charts). However, the
Cochise County violent crime rate has
been fluctuating quite a bit over the years.
That county’s rate has had drastic ups and
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downs in terms of the percentage of violent
crime. In 2008 the violent crime rate did
drop, but it went back up in 2009 and then
slid downward over 2010-2012. Looking
at the border region as a whole it seems
that violent crime is going down as well.
There are certain individual counties that
have spikes in increased violent crime rate
like Cochise County and Laredo, Texas;
in addition, the counties in California,
Imperial and San Diego, had the lowest
violent crime rate amongst all counties
examined. Interestingly, all four states have
border and non-border counties that state
level data combines. Due to these factors
at the state levels and variances in violent
crime rates there cannot be a definitive
generalization about violent crime along
the border. We could surmise that 1) the
Merida Initiative could not be expected to
be overwhelmingly effective; however, it
may have been effective in reducing violent
crime in some but not all border counties,
and 2) if not for the Merida Initiative,
the violent crime would have been worse.
It is difficult to prove that violent crime
rates and the Merida Initiative are linked
through data due to the fact that state level
data collapses county data with state data.
Obviously not all of a state’s counties are
on the border, and so the data is skewed a
bit by the other counties crime data.
The reasons for this reduction in violent
crime and if it is attributable to the Merida
Initiative are varied just as we saw before.
Every report that has been examined in this
assessment has not connected the Merida
Initiative to a reduction in violent crime
along the border. The reason as to why
there is no connection depends upon who
is asked. As pointed out by Tom Barry
(2011) of the Center for International
Policy (CIP) a left leaning think tank, the
decrease seen in violent crime along the
border may be due to the new Southwest
Counter Narcotics policy of 2009 which
compliments the Merida Initiative efforts
to crackdown on the drug cartels. Both of
these initiatives bolster border security that
could reduce the rate of violent crime along
the border.
This report by CIP also cites the very
visible display of border security and
enforcement by the Obama administration.
The administration’s buildup of security
might contribute towards the violence seen
in Mexico, as drug cartels try to control
their own turfs. In other words, the Merida
Initiative might actually be making the
problem of drug cartel violence worse
in Mexico which, in turn, could make it
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worse for the US at some point. Currently
for the US side of the border this show of
strong border security has given renewed
life to many border towns and cities (Barry,
2011). As for the Merida Initiative being
the root cause for this renewed life in
border towns and cities and strong security
complex it is uncertain, according to Barry.
The violence experienced by the Mexican
side does not seem to be spilling over to
the US side at this point in time. It should
be noted that the Obama administration
has put in place policies and vigorously
enforced laws that crackdown on drug
cartels and trafficking (Barry, 2011, pp.911).
A professor of Military Studies at the US
Army War College Paul Kan (2012) says
that the Obama administration was one
of the first to actually include controlling
violence along the border and the unstable
environment in Mexico as a national
security threat to the US. The Obama
administration was the first to consider
border violence and instability in Mexico
as national security threats. Kan cites lack
of being able to control the violence on
the Mexican side of the border as a threat
to the people of the US and its borders
combined with the demand from the US
for drugs as a major problem for the “war
on drugs.” Basically the US and Mexico
can implement policies as they have been
and are doing, but if there is not enough
coordination the problem of violence along
the US side of the border and the spillover
effect will continue. One of the previous
complaints from the RAND Corporation’s
analysis of the Merida Initiative was
its lack of coordination between local
police forces and the government which
ultimately makes the problem worse. Kan
says that if both Mexico and the US want
to win the “war on drugs” it most likely
will not be with a military operation. No
military can beat the supply and demand
factor of this situation. The reasons for
the increase in violence in Mexico, Kan
states, are a combination of institutional
erosion, NAFTA, party politics, culture and
machismo, and access to weapons among
other factors. He argues that taking care
of just one or two of these problems is not
going to cure the problem in Mexico or the
threat to US national security. Each issue
has to be dealt with individually and that
one of the larger aspects of taking care of
the problem is dealing with the subject of
human rights which the Merida Initiative
does to a point. Although Kan does not
directly address the Merida Initiative, his
study of the US-Mexican partnership on

the “war on drugs” is relevant. This study
shows that the Merida Initiative may well
not be sufficiently comprehensive to win
the “war on drugs” and reduce border
violence (Kan, 2012, pp.72-132).
The NGO Witness for Peace is even more
strident in its call for more attention to
the issue of human rights in the “war on
drugs.” Witness for Peace does not feel
that US policies have done enough to
counter police abuses and corruption. They
also cite the same problem that Kan did
in that supply and especially demand of
drugs has to be dealt with. This demand is
compounded by the fact that there is a lot
of poverty in Mexico and drug trafficking
is very profitable. Secondly, Witness for
Peace echoes the same sentiments that Kan
did which are that a military operation for
a situation such as this is destined to fail; it
cites the Plan for Columbia which allocated
$5.6 billion to Columbia to combat drugs
without any success. Currently, the US
Congress has allocated $1.5 billion from
2008-2010 for the Merida Initiative to help
Mexico.
The area of human rights is of a huge
concern for the group Witness for Peace
as well. Included in that 1.5 billion dollar
aid are conditions on human rights that
have to be met before the aid is given to
the Mexican Ministry of the Interior. To
hopefully stop human rights abuses before
they occur, Congress laid out four criteria
that must be met before 15% of the Merida
funds will be given. The criteria are as
follows: “transparency and accountability
in law enforcement, civilian trials for
military officials accused of human rights
violations, consultation with human rights
groups, and prohibiting testimony obtained
through torture” (Witness for Peace, 2011).
Many citizens in Mexico do not feel that is
enough to stop the abuses and corruption,
and some have complained that the Merida
Initiative gives the Mexican police and
military more power to disregard their
human rights. Results of these provisions
have been slow in coming as of 2010; only
$26 million was withheld due to the lack
of human rights oversight by the Mexican
government (Witness for Peace, 2011).
Even though there have been so many
critics of the Merida Initiative some still
believe that it has helped but that the US
government has a very mixed and murky
way of dealing with the violent crime
related to drug cartels along the border.
Ray Walser (2010), an analyst for the
conservative Heritage Foundation, thinks

the Merida Initiative was a good policy
move towards controlling the violence in
Mexico, and thus the violence would not
spread to US communities as some have
feared. Without the US backing equipment
such as x-ray vans, helicopters, armored
vehicles and better cooperation with
intelligence gathering, the violence could
spill over the US border. The intelligence
gathering aspect is very crucial in deterring
and detecting drug related violent crime
and so are the intelligence teams the Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) helps Mexico
put together. These intelligence teams help
coordinate law enforcement assistance to
state and local agencies in Mexico.
However, Walser is also critical of the
Merida Initiative. Walser’s main issue with
the Initiative as discussed earlier in my
findings was the very slow shipment of
equipment to the Mexican authorities. The
issue of getting the Mexican authorities
assistance in time to make an impact
has also been in the way of getting the
necessary funds together as concern for
where the money is going and how it is
being handled also plague this initiative.
It is hoped that the new National
Southwestern Border CounterNarcotics
Strategy will help offset any gaps that the
Merida Initiative has in its implementation
(Walser, 2010). This alone will not help,
according to Walser who maintains that
the US has to have strong domestic and
international policies to counter the drug
cartels and violence in Mexico (Walser,
2010). The Merida Initiative seems to have
been a good start on working on a very
complex problem with many facets to the
problem according to this report by the
Heritage Foundation.
The Congressional Research Service’s
(CRS) most recent report as cited by
Finklea on the Merida Initiative maintains
that the violence has decreased on both
sides of the border. Throughout the period
of time the Merida Initiative has been in
effect around a billion dollars has been
spent. This notion that violence has gone
down can be supported by my findings that
as violent crime as a whole decreased, the
amount of funding on the Merida Initiative
has increased. The figure of money being
spent will only grow as time goes on since
last year the total was $1.2 billion. With all
of this money spent and the violent crime
rate dropping well before the Initiative
took hold, the actual effectiveness of the
Initiative is the question.
The US Congress has been gauging

implementation according to two criteria:
the number of training opportunities, and
the rate of delivery of Merida Initiative
resources and assistance. Even though
the US has expedited deliveries in recent
years, this does not necessarily mean
that the Initiative has been effective (US
Government Accountability Office). The
increase in those delivering the needed
supplies to the Mexican authorities does
not mean it helped the Merida Initiative
as my data showed an increase in violent
crime along the border in 2011 when the
deliverers were expedited. Before those
deliveries the violent crime rate was down
overall. As CRS points out, the positive
effects of these deliveries and assistance
in 2011 still does not show whether these
deliveries made a huge difference or not.
Another factor that needs to be considered
is maintenance of the equipment the
Mexican government receives. The training
that the Initiative gives to the Mexican
authorities, according to CRS, shows
us a turnover rate of police officers after
receiving training, and the US government
is not tracking their progress as they should
be. This way of measuring does not give
clear or accurate results of whether the
Merida Initiative is actually reducing the
violence along the border. Conclusive
evidence cannot be gained as to whether
this Initiative has decreased violent crime
along the US border further since its
inception. The US government cites the
amount of extraditions and killing of drug
trade organization leaders as a sign of the
achievements of the Merida Initiative.
Again however, there are many problems
with measuring the achievements of this
initiative as is evident from the results of
this study and the many others that have
tried to measure Merida’s success (Seelke &
Finklea, 2014, pp.4-35).
Conclusions that can be drawn from this
study are that the violent crime along the
US side of the border has gone down with
the exception of a couple of counties in
Arizona and Texas. It is interesting that
the violent crime rate was going down well
before the Merida Initiative. This shows
that proponents of the Merida Initiative
cannot conclusively give all the credit for
reducing violence along the border to the
Merida Initiative. This reduction in crime
could be due to increased border security
and enforcement and previous assistance
given to Mexico as well. The actual results
of violence spilling over into the US from
Mexican drug cartels cannot be accurately
proven based on the evidence available.
There are various reasons for the variances

in violent crime rates along the border and
their relationship to the Merida Initiative.
They could be due to the lapse in time
of getting the supplies to the proper
authorities in Mexico, a continued lack of
coordination between national and local
law enforcement, human rights violations,
emphasis on this being a “war” or the
aspect of supply and demand that can
only be controlled in the short-term versus
long-term situation. Thus far we have seen
that the Merida Initiative has made limited
efforts to address the deeper causes of the
drug trade. One structural cause is political,
such as weak Mexican state institutions,
including rampant government corruption.
There are also social factors, such as
community bonds weakened by migration
and the drug trade. Cultural norms
idealizing the drug trade are another factor.
Greatest of all is the economic factor.
Relatively few economic opportunities
outside of narco-trafficking, combined
with the high demand for drugs in the US,
make the drug trade a tempting source
of employment (McCaffrey, 2009). Peter
Andreas (2009) could give us another
explanation as to why the recent spike in
violent crime has occurred. The border was
never out of control because the US never
really had control of the border in the first
place. The many facets of this problem
make it difficult to assess whether progress
on the issue at hand has made a difference.
This whole notion that the border is “out of
control,” even when violent crime is going
down, could point to political motivations
beyond just controlling the drug violence.
The Merida Initiative may be in part an
effort to appease a hard-core faction in
Congress that prefers straightforward police
and military responses to narco-trafficking
and border violence rather than far more
complex comprehensive approaches.
Instead of looking at what should be
looked at which is the best interest for
those people living along the border, there
has been a concentration on fighting and
winning the war on drugs. Not enough
concrete data is available to see if even this
violence that we see is directly linked to the
drug cartels. The Merida Initiative’s premise
is that there is a close correlation between
violent crime along the US-Mexico border,
and the drug trade. However, there is
not yet enough data to demonstrate this
correlation. Unfortunately, US policy
appears more attached to that perceived
correlation rather than what is in the best
interest of people living both sides of that
border.
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Appendix
Violent Crime Rates in 16 US border counties
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Footnote: Due to lack of data at the county level in the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) data from the town of
Luna Deming had to be used in its place.
Footnote: Due to a lack of data at the county level in the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) El Paso had to be
used in place of county level data.
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